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POI'.JT . . 
s':';,TL:lC:JT OF THE Klem OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
RELIEF SOUGHT OtJ APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGCMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING 
TO Tl\KE INTO CONSIDERATiml DEFENDANT'S 
INHERITANCE IN THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE, IN ESSENCE, THE COURT AT THE SAHE 
TIME, DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE 
LIKE OR EQUAL INTEREST EXISTING IN THE 
PL!,INTIFF ............. . 
POINT II. 
THE COURT Itl AWARDING 1/2 SHARE OF 
APPELLANT'S RETIREMENT ANNUITY WAS ATTEMPTING 
TO FIX DEFENDANT'S INTEREST AS OF THE DATE OF 
TllE DIVORCE AND TO PRC:CLUDE ANY DIMUNITION 
OR CllANGE OF THAT INTEREST SUBSEQUENTLY BY 
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I·, TllE :;L'i•J<f.1·:F COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:~:J,".i"- i.,. 'l'i~~.::ch, 
Plcilnt l ff and 
A[..>[..>Cl lz,r,t, 
CASE NO. 19155 
v. 
v;p, YriE R. TANNER, 
Defendzrnt and 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Tins appeal is made from the final Order of the Honor-
cJLilc· Calvin Gould, Judge of the District Court, in and for 
tr,,. s~,·0ncl Judicial District, Weber County, State of Utah, 
qr.rnt1 r:g the respective parties a divorce and division of 
f:-Jrcperty. 
DISPOSITION IN THE L0\'1ER COURT 
Tl:c Court granted a divorce to each of the parties and 
Ji··1.1'.d the I"rcrer·t~· equitably between the parties. 
PJ:i,ICF soL:c11T ON APPEAL 
·; '"' r.•.S["Jflc 1< nt SC:c :Zs thcit the Judgment of the Lower 
'" t 1,._ Llf•!1· I;, cir,,; ti at the Judgment and Decree of Di-
"'I ''· 
l l l I l 1 ·! 
;uci, t·, Uw property of the parties do not 
!"."" ,, 
The purt1es \VL't-~ ff\.ll r1•, d rc>t ,1r,r 1 1ux1:11dlL'l~· th'(_•nt 
(29) years prior to the Courts gr0nt1ng a divorce. fl, 
parties subsequent to marriage spent some time in acqu1r 11 
their education and professional skills in est,:ibJ i~ln 
themselves as professionals in the area of Social Work. ~· 
the time of the divorce, the Appellant testified thar sr 0 
then had a retirement plan, which was worth $34,200.G, 
(R. 132) 
At the same time, there was also testimony that b•Jl!·. 
parties had some type of interest in inheritance, t!k 
husband being in a partnership, he being a 1/8 partner in 
Ranch owned in the Northwestern corner of the State as p~r: 
of an inheritance received prior to marriage. 
The evidence showed that the ranch had dcc· l ir .• · 
substantially in value, had little or no value, at the t1:c·c 
of the divorce proceeding, and th,:it n~ contribution had be• 
made by the parties during the course of the marri~" 
(R. 132, 141, 142, 143, 144, 153, 181) 
At the time of trial, the Court wuulcl not ,:illow 
tioning of the plaintiff \vi th re'Jurcl to her [CCJC.siblr· ir ! ' 
t,:ince of the Farm of her purL"nt•;, wh11:h v.·r.uld 'l" 
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cl; • •_I ( ! • 1 ~"I . In dddi ti on, the testimony 
t r ~ 1 f- t 1 p"rtiCc:; macle little or no contribution 
t ]11 LcJ11•l:' inhcritiln•-rc interest and received some 
tits 1n ti!<_· <.-!a'J of rneoilt and other items but at the same 
t :r: c·, the'/ 1-."crc consic;tent 1,- tilking large losses on their 
t1:-: u·t-urns because_· of that operation. (R. 142, 143) In 
ctd<litic1n, the evidence clearly established that there was a 
substantial inclebtedness owed by the partnership in the area 
o:- $~00 ,000-$600 ,000. ( p. 174) . Both Mr. Tanner and his .. 
~Jrut-hL:l tcstif ied that the property had declined 
su!-cLinticil ly in Villue and was almost totally unmarketable 
with likely not clearing the existing debt, most of which 
»:ei:; c·crdue at thClt elate. (R. 174). 
f-' 
ARGC/-!EclT 
POINT I. 
TllE DiSTRTCT COl'RT \·IAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO 
Ticc:c 1·:10 coc:SI:JCRllTIO'.; DEFENDANT' s INHERITANCE 
I:. THL DIVJSIOIJ OF THE MARITAL ESTATE, IN ESSENCE, 
Till: cnr'RT t,T Tl!!: S1\'.·IE TIME, DID NOT T1'\KE INTO 
1_·, <:.o 1;11:1<,;Tirv; TliE LIKE OR EQUAL INTEREST 
l:\'.:iTl'.:G l:i TllE PL1\I!JTIFF. 
~.-~<::1u:i 31-1-J-S, governs the Court in the division of 
t__l 1-':' :J: t!H_' fc-1'.·:11c>n1r:.9 of the Decree of Divorce and 
, 11 1 r J,_., - rl?L' 
! l 
n1vc_ir,·1' i~-:; made, 
urc!.( :- _; in re l.J t ion to 
<1r;d p..J.rt1es, and 
the Court 
the 
the 
maintcn,A;'\'( c)t lh1-.: 1·,d1 ti( 
as may be equital_)lc. 11 
and ·J11 ldtL'l1, 
In this case, the Court apparcn t ly cu me to the:: cone l us iur. 
that the prospective inheritances of the parties were toe 
speculative or remote to place any specific value upon thee 
in the division of property. In fact, the Court at one 
point, specifically denied further questioning of the 
Plaintiff with regard to her possible inheritance and the 
Court, in fact, specifically recites inheritances are 
separate estates under Utah law. (R. ;!6) 
With regard to the question of inheritances being 
separate estates, Respondent has not been able to find an1 
specific case law in the State of Utah, but is aware o'. 
several decisions in neighboring states. The Supreme Cour'. 
of the State of Colorado in the case of Gaskie v. Gask1e, 
534 P. 2nd 629, recognizes that a ranch which was inheritc~ 
by the wife 11 years prior to marriage had not lost ito 
identity, as the a separate property of the wife. 
Particularly where the rentention of the ranch was not a1deJ 
in any manner by the husband's efforts in any capacit~-
Further, the Court held that the ranch property and it.-
improvements would not be included in the marital estJte 
its division by the trial Court. The Cuurt in t IL1' 
recognized the fact that inherited property is nut f· 
excluded from consideration in division of marital ptupert_, 
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1,,11 t It ti t lt1- pC!rty claiming an interest must show that by 
lti.1 r-ffotl", to<JPther with the other spouse, he either built 
up or kept the family worth intact or in some manner 
con tr ibu ted to the value of the property. The Court also 
specifically found that the spouse claiming an interest had 
provided little or no management or supervision over the 
property which is the subject of the inheritance. In 
addition, as in the present case, the parties themselves 
believed the ranch to be the separate property of the spouse 
who inherited it. 
In the present case, Mrs. Tanner has testified that the 
parties considered the husband's 1/8 interest in T & T 
Enterprises, which operated the ranch to be a separate 
property, and that they had received nothing from the ranch 
other than occasional meat or other small items. The 
Memorandum Decision rendered in this case states specifical-
ly: 
"The separate estate of the defendant, which 
came to him by inheritance is therefore, 
irrelevant to " decision in this case, 
as is an expectancy or trust in which 
pld1ntitf mC1y be named a beneficiary." 
then w~nt on to decide that the respective 
111 t"1_•nto; of l!1c: p-:itliec;, would also off-set each other 
111! did n<Jt dv:,1rd a r:;ort1on to either one, but did divide 
t 11- - .1nnu t t,- which had been purchased by the wife on a 
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monthly b.:isis, while lb.· husL.''"' :1 t 1 nu._,,, t' 1 rt r 
toward the necessit1e~ ul 
Other Courts that llav\._~ S[..1t\·i_::-_.:._r_·all~, C"nns11].__,r,·\l 
question of a parties' interest in inheritance h,"·-·e de•:L;,cc 
to award any property sett le men t from that inhcc r i tar.<:", 
Whitney v. Whitney, 330 P.2nd 947. The fact, many Coutto 
recognize inheritance as being identified with separate 
property concepts in States which have enacted commun1t" 
property statutes. In the case of Petjrson v. Peterson, 42; 
P.2nd 736, the Court held that property which has been give~ 
to the husband alone in the form of an inheritance, woul c 
remain his alone, unless specifically necessary for alirnor·· 
or support for the wife or minor children. In the case c: 
Palmer v. Palmer, 465 P.2nd 156, (decided by the Supre~e 
Court of Oklahoma) , the Court once again denied any intercs~ 
in a sum of money which would come to the wife as l.-.1 
inheritance and which the Court specifically found hcicl rec 
been enhanced through any efforts o( the husband. 
The cases cited by the Appellant, all seemed to de 
with a gift, not in contemplation of death, b"' parents 
other members of the famil,·, 1-:hich appaIC'ntl~· ,,,•re tr. t·· 
used by the parties durin•J thcc n:.1r1 l30c', L·1· 
otherwise limited in an/ ri,ll1ne1 '- l ~J; 
these cases would be appl1caLlce t•. t '· l-' r (, ~-,' ! I I 
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::t-··r1 t c~ til1 RL'.-,f-'(Jndc,nt is dubious at best. A recent 
,,f this Court, which is made in light of the 
~~l__l:'__._~J,:rt dccisi0n 57G P.2nd 1274, is the case of 
Bennett, 607 P.2nd 839, which found that no 
~re~cnt value could be assigned to the portion of the 
µ,,rt1·' s rcetiremcnt fund which had been contributed by the 
l'.::;. Government and that it was error for the Court to 
cowcidcr that contribution in making an award. The Court 
st,1tes: 
"Because the testimony and findings in this 
case clearly establishes that that portion 
of the Plaintiff's retirement fund contri-
buted by the U.S. Government has no present 
value-and may not have any value in the 
future-we hold that it was error for the 
District Court to consider this matter as 
one of tho assets of the parties, thereby 
using it as one of the significant 
predicates of the Courts determination of 
the property division between the parties 
provided for in the Decree." 
In tlw Enq lcrt case, pr2viously mentioned, the Courts 
Sf.Jl.'.ClflCdll'/ mentions that the basis for property 
~,c._ttlcmcnt, and support awards, is the pertinent 
u:· th•_· p,.,rtics, and the determination of the 
·..ic..c· to ~' n·e thc b"st interests and welfare 
'. l'' ~ : r t l,' '.; -:1 r. J l I.(_~ l r ch 1 1 d re r: . 
Ir. t 111 \.,.' l ff' lS at present earning 
1 1 ~ l ·. n, i 1 t l.._1n t ht_' Lusbanc.J cJnd h.J.s her own separate 
.1t1''n l"" large an!luity which she has 
7 
contributed to monthl'/ O\'c·r the cour::-;e: c_it tli1.: r:-1,11 r1dqc', 
addition to a subc;tant i .\ l \\']1i1'l1 1 .. h'r-::1 
become entitl0d to u~"'' r 1~·, it t · ! t: I,, 
case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, r,is !'.2nd 1218, thic; Co'"' 
once again recognizes the well established doctrine: 
"In a divorce case, even though the 
proceedings are equitable, this Court 
may review the evidence, this Court, 
accords considerable defference to the 
Findings and Judgment of the Trial Court 
due to its advantageous position. In an 
appeal this Court will not disturb the 
action of the Trial Court unless the 
evidence clearly preponderat"ts to the 
contrary, or the Trial Court has abused its 
discretion, or misapplied principles of law." 
The Court states further: 
"There is no fixed formula upon which to 
determine a division of properties, it is 
prerogative of the Court to make whatever 
disposition of the property as it deems fair, 
equitable, necessary for the protection and 
welfare of the parties. In the division of 
marital property, the Trial Judge has wide 
discretion, and.his Findings will not be 
disturbed unless the record indicates an 
abuse thereof." 
With regard to the contentions of Appellant that the proper-
ty was worth some 2 million dollars in December of 198', 
this contention is once again answered by the Court. In 
case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, which states" 
"The marital r~slutc is c\'c1lu(1t1',; ~l.cco.:riliny 
to the existing property int<·rcc;t ,1t t:, ... r i: 
the marriage was tL:rn11ndtt...:d Ly t_\1( [l('r·r·>' 
Court." 
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'!''"· ';"I'' t"e•,t1rnuny and evidcence, with regard to the 
·111 t 1 't1t '"'ll1 1c of lhc ran1·h in which the Respondent had a 1/8 
11 1 1> 11lcJ111·,, irrterccst· was that there was little, if any value 
in the ptopcrty anrl it was almost impossible to mark it at 
tlldt. point. In the case of Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2nd 
23~, this Court recognized that property held solely in the 
n,11,.e of one party, which had been acquired as a gift from 
his father, would be treated as separate property of that 
party and the Court refused to Decree any type of interest 
in t!cilt property to the wife, even though the same had been 
conveyed by the husband during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings, subsequent to trial, but prior to the time the 
final Decree was entered. 
Thus it appears, that the division of property in the 
Jn';tant case, was done equitably and in accordance with 
rurrcnt principals of lilw, the Court considering any possi-
b'c inhcritancc interest of the parties to be irrelevant, 
c1tLcr because ther0 was no value in them or because they 
1.;crc tile sc•pcJralc µrc1pcrty of the relative parties. 
;, 
POINT II. 
Tl! C I 'C'i. I<'f I;; ;,b'llRD ItJG 1 ! 2 SP.,\RE OF APPELLANT'S 
kETIP!CiLC;T 1\~i:!L'lTY \•ll\S ATTG!PTING TO FIX 
l'fTi: I .".';' ':i r:;T!:RC~T 1\S OF THE DATE OF THE 
\!1'.'<'i' :.::ri T" i 1 H!::CLUDC ;\'.;Y rJI:.Jl'tHTION OR 
c·11,\:;1· \,I Tll1\T INTF.RE~;T SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE 
I';.-.,., :I'! 
t 1r • 111 1\[;c·lL111t's Grief, it is impossible to 
\;\ur t 1;,· t.1:c Lll"; will st;itc, when the Appellant 
9 
retires 10 years hence, or the relative v~duc oft:, 
annuity, therefore, the· Cuurt in tLi '..; c,1:-~c, ~;c.uq!1t tu ti:-: t 
Respondent's intc1est i11 thcJt 01.11u1t\' a: Lic,ing $17,lcl' 
not subject to drn1uni tion, oif-sets, or othcrwisi' c:' 
subsequent date. 
This attempt to equitably divide property which 
essence was jointly acquired through the monthly contribu-
tions of the wife, while the husband paid the living ex-
penses, is once again within the discretion anc 
should not be overturned as previously mentioned in Fletcher 
v. Fletcher. As far as the possible tax consequences, this 
case is unlike Savage v. Savage, cited by the Appellant, i' 
that the Trial Court has not retained jurisdiction tc 
specifically determine any tax questions as was done in t~ 0 
Savage case, and such action was incumbent upon lLc 
Appellant if they wish to preserve any_ such protection anci 
to request the same from the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court acted properly in dividing the assets of the 
parties, first based on the fact that it excluded evide11 ,:c 
with regard to the inheritance which plaintiff was du.; •-
receive and secondly, with regard to the fact that 
little, if any, value could be proven as far as the, !-'., 
dent's interest in inherit0ncc' w1tl1 T T L11teq 1 1 1, 
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furthL·r, tl1c1t the Court was justified in the case law, 
,;,.; 1:1iri9 any such inheritance which has not been contributed 
tr, by t:h<c µarties during the course of the marriage to be a 
separate property of the µarty so holding. With regard to 
the division of the annuity, the Court attempted to place a 
present value on that annuity at the time of trial so that 
there would be no further or future disputes between the 
parties regarding the same. No effort was made on the part 
of the Appellant to attempt to reserve any ruling on tax 
consequences, if there was in fact any bona fide concern 
over those consequences. 
RESPEC'.i'FULLY SUBl!ITTED this __/;_ day of September, 1983. 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
Ogden, Utah 
Telephone: 
CLRTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Avenue 
84401 
621-2464 
I hereby rertify that I mailed a true and correct 
cor '.' of the abovL ancl foregoing Brief of Defendant- Respon-
dent tc James D. Vilas, Attorney for Plaintiff-
,\F[•C:llant, B;ink of Ulah Ilu1lci.1ng, Suite 300, 2605 Washington 
Ill\'cl., O<Jckn, Ut,1h 84401, by placing same in the U.S. Mail, 
pn~~t<Jfjl~ prc:Ii,11d thi~ _k_ day of September, 1983. 
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